


















This paper advances an argument in support of technology-
specific tailoring of incentives to innovate. With a focus on 
patent incentives, the argument proceeds from the identification 
of the factors likely to have a bearing on (a) the differential role 
and effectiveness of patents in different technological regimes; 
(b) the varying degree of relevance of the various functions of 
the patent system in different technological regimes, and (c) the 
nature of the limits the IPRs system encounters in performing its 
functions in different technological regimes. These differences 
are then exemplified with reference to software and the life 
sciences and the means through which flexibility in the 
provision of incentives might be achieved in the two domains 
are explored.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of the adequate provision of incentives to innovate has become a 
prominent topic of current debate in recent years. While, during the ‘90s, the 
theoretical discourse has focused mainly on the identification of the optimal 
characteristics of a uniform IP system, this decade has seen an increase in interest for 
alternative incentive mechanisms and for a more nuanced characterization of the 
functioning of the IP system in different technological domains. With respect to the 
latter issue, however, the gap is still very wide between empirical analyses and 
theoretical reflection.  
The aim of this paper is to make one step in the direction of narrowing this gap by 
reviewing the relevant theoretical and empirical literature from the perspective of the 
identification of the links between IP incentives and different technological regimes 
and market dynamics. To ensure tractability, the focus will be on the patent system. 
The general thrust of the argument will suggest that the varied role and performance 
of the patent system in different technological domains warrant some sort of 
technology-specific tailoring of incentives to innovation. In other words, the “one-
size-fits-all” principle that seems part of the conventional wisdom on the patent 
system and has found, to some extent, an expression in the 1994 TRIPs Agreement, 
should be put into question. This doesn’t mean, however, that technology-specific 
legislation is necessarily called for, as it is sometimes assumed. Indeed, a variety of 
policy instruments might be used to ensure the necessary flexibility in the provision of 
incentives adequate to different technological domains. 
These ideas will be exemplified by reference to the life sciences and the software 
domains. The choice of these technological domains is, of course, all but coincidental. 
Software and the life sciences are most apposite for our purposes for a variety of 
reasons. On one side, these domains display attributes sufficiently well characterized 
to allow a meaningful comparison. On the other side, both domains have recently 
experienced and are still currently experiencing significant changes in the legal 
framework within which innovation takes place. In the U.S., a series of court 
decisions has effectively extended patentability to genetically-modified organisms1, 
software2 and business methods3 starting from the 1980s. In Europe, patentability of 
biotechnology inventions has been regulated through Directive 98/44/EC and a 
proposal for a Directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions is 
currently under discussion. These changes, resulting mainly in easier access to patent 
protection for inventions falling within the two domains, have gone hand in hand with 
a remarkable increase in patent applications, which surely magnifies the effects of the 
legal changes we have briefly mentioned. This makes the two sectors an important 
                                                
1 The landmark court case in this regard is Diamond v. Chacrabarty (1980). The U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed in that occasion the eligibility for patents of genetically engineered organisms. 
2Among the most prominent U.S. cases concerning the patentability of software can be 
mentioned the Diamond v. Diehr case (1981), the In re Alappat decision (1994) and the AT&T 
Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc. (1999).   
3 The most significant decision in this regard in the United States is the State Street Bank & 
Trust v. Signature Financial Services decision (1998). 
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stage for exploring the opportunity of technology-specific tailoring of incentives to 
innovate.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the general rationale for patent 
protection is presented, with a view at highlighting the most salient aspects of the 
current policy debate on the patent system and the most pressing tensions presently 
affecting its functioning. Section 3 sets out to identify the factors likely to have a 
bearing on the differential role and effectiveness of patents in different technological 
domains as well as the varying degree of relevance of the various functions of the 
patent system in different technological regimes. Of course, technological regimes 
differ also as to the nature of the limits the IPRs system encounters in performing its 
functions and to the nature of the remedies available to confront these shortcomings. 
We introduce the comparison between software and the life sciences in section 4, 
making a case for technology-specific tailoring of incentives to innovate. Section 5 
provides an overview of the means through which flexibility in the provision of 
incentives might be achieved. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE INCREASINGLY COMPLEX RATIONALE FOR PATENT PROTECTION  
Patent protection has been historically credited with a variety of functions, the 
most widely acknowledged of which is surely the incentive function, generally 
associated to the so-called "reward theory" of patents. The argument for the existence 
of an incentive function of patents rests on the hypothesis that, absent patent 
protection, innovators would find difficulties in appropriating the returns from their 
intellectual creations, with obvious negative consequences in terms of innovation 
incentives. Society is thus ready to grant a limited monopoly for a fixed term on the 
newly created intellectual assets in return for the inventor's innovative effort, so that a 
trade-off between monopoly costs and benefits in terms of increased innovation is 
established. The convenience of incurring such trade-off, however, has long been put 
into question by those emphasizing the virtues of competition as a stimulus to 
innovation. This alternative view, expressed among others by Kenneth Arrow (1962) 
and more recently by Hellwig and Irmen (2000), Boldrin and Levine (2002) and Quah 
(2002), stresses the existence of incentives to innovate other than state-created 
monopolies over ideas and suggests that monopoly may be less effective than 
competition in creating an environment conducive to innovation.  
A second relevant function attributed to the patent system is the transactional 
function. Patents aim to solve the well-known Arrovian paradox, allowing for the 
exchange of intangibles. This is true not only when intangibles are in the form of end 
products, but especially when they constitute inputs into further innovative activities. 
Thus, the availability of patent protection has been identified as a necessary 
precondition for the emergence of markets for technology and specialized technology 
suppliers (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001) and the existence of patent 
protection over the inputs to a collaborative research endeavor is commonly held as a 
factor facilitating inter-firm R&D collaboration. To be sure, the incentive and the 
transactional functions are strictly intertwined. On one side, by assigning ownership 
entitlements to successive innovators, patents determine bargaining positions that 
facilitate welfare-enhancing transactions and enable some sort of division of profits 
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among subsequent contributors to a given stream of research. This, in turn, affects the 
extent of incentives available to successive innovators. On the other side, in absence 
of transactional impediments, the assignment of strong and broad patent rights may 
constrain the duplication of innovative effort while preserving sufficient incentives 
for further product development and refinement (Kitch, 1977). More generally, recent 
literature in the IP field emphasized that private parties' ability to rearrange sensibly 
patent rights through bargaining substantially affects the optimal design of initial 
entitlements (Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002).  
Patents also perform a disclosure function, according to the so-called "contract 
theory" of patents (Denicolò and Franzoni, 2004). Disclosure of technical information 
that would otherwise be kept secret is seen as the quid for the quo of legal protection 
in a bargain between the inventor and society. In other words, patents constitute a 
legal instrument inducing the free dissemination of innovative knowledge. In this 
perspective, the requirement common to most patent systems that patent applications 
provide sufficient information to enable a person skilled in the art to reproduce the 
invention (EPC art. 83; section 112 U.S.C. 35) can be interpreted both as a way of 
clearly delimiting the boundaries of the object of legal protection and as an expression 
of the disclosure objective embedded in the patent system. Under the "disclosure 
function" label can be categorized also an indirect effect of patents, prevalent in the 
life sciences. Indeed, the availability of patent protection encourages researchers in 
corporate laboratories in the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industries to diffuse 
their research results at conferences and scientific meetings once patents have been 
applied for (Cohen et al., 2002).  
Finally, patents are valuable for their signaling function. Possession of patents 
may serve the purpose of signaling a firm's innovative capabilities and increase its 
ability to raise the necessary capital, especially through venture capital financing. In 
so doing, patents thus help channeling funds in the most appropriate directions and 
play a role in promoting market entry. The relevance of the signaling function tends, 
of course, to be inversely correlated to firm size. Indeed, small innovative firms are 
capital-constrained and often lack means other than venture capital financing in order 
to pursue their innovative endeavors. This function has proven particularly crucial in 
the biotechnology realm, where the astonishing innovative results achieved by small 
start-ups could arguably materialize absent the patenting/venture capital financing 
link that has strongly characterized the sector in recent years especially in the U.S. 
(Powell, 1996; Coriat and Orsi, 2002).  
While the four above-mentioned functions are naturally and necessarily 
complementary, their relative relevance and the emphasis put on them from a policy 
perspective has somewhat changed in the past two decades. A shift in focus away 
from the incentive rationale for patent protection and toward the transactional and 
signaling rationales has characterized, to some extent, the public policy debate. The 
transactional role of patents has featured as an essential component of the conceptual 
toolkit of proponents of the patentability of publicly-funded research results. In this 
connection, the argument in support of patentability has rested largely on the 
assumption that patenting would facilitate public-private and university-industry 
transactions and would therefore help turning university inventions into useful 
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innovations (see, e.g., Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998)4. On the negative side, the impact 
on the effectiveness of the patent system of various forms of transactional failure has 
also received greater attention in recent years – the metaphor of the "tragedy of the 
anticommons" (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) being perhaps the most notable 
expression of this debate. As for the signaling function, its increasing relevance goes 
hand in hand with the steady increase in investment in venture capital as a percentage 
of GDP in most developed countries (OECD STI Scoreboard, 2003).  
This shift in focus of the public policy discourse is accompanied by an 
amplification of a number of tensions affecting the current patent system.  Some of 
these tensions can be categorized as exogenous to the system itself. This is the case, 
for instance, of the pressures exerted on the patent system by the shrinking distinction 
between basic and applied research in most scientific domains. The distance between 
fundamental knowledge and practically applicable research results is lessening. On 
the one hand, corporate laboratories increasingly invest in basic research and abide by 
rules of dissemination once distinctive of public institutions (peer-reviewed journals, 
conferences, etc.). On the other hand, research at public institutions more and more 
frequently leads to the development of intellectual assets that are dual in character and 
relies, sometimes aggressively, on IP management strategies that were once the 
prerogative of the corporate world (OECD, 2003a). Consider, for instance, "pure" 
mathematical algorithms that constitute both the foundation of further research in 
mathematics and the building blocks of valuable software products. Similarly, 
biotechnology inventions often constitute both the raw ingredients of research and 
practically applicable diagnostics and therapeutics. The conventional wisdom 
advocating research exemptions for public laboratories on the premise of the 
existence of some sort of division of labor between the public and the private sphere 
reflecting the distinction between basic and applied research is thus put under strain at 
the same time that access issues are becoming more prominent for reasons that will be 
explored later (Merrill et al., 2004).  
Another source of exogenous tensions is the increasingly marked 
interdisciplinarity of innovation. This is apparent especially in the life sciences 
domain, where the so-called "Functional Genomics Revolution" set off in the '80s 
(Kafatos, 2002), while introducing mass-scale, rapid and global descriptive analysis 
methods in biology, has reinforced the need for a strong link with experimental 
biology. New disciplines sprung out of the "Revolution" such as bioinformatics, 
proteomics and expression genomics have a strong interdisciplinary nature. The 
primary consequence of this phenomenon can be described as a more pressing 
demand that the patent system perform effectively its transactional function. 
Interdisciplinarity implies a need for coordination of multiple and diverse actors that 
if, on one side, calls for strong and well-defined IP rights as the precondition for 
effective exchange of intangible information, on the other side exacerbates bargaining 
difficulties due to biases in the evaluation of entitlements and differences in cultural 
backgrounds, especially as regards the interaction of public and private actors 
(Eisenberg, 1999). In addition to this, interdisciplinarity may impose in some fields, 
                                                
4 See below the discussion of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act.  
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and most notably in bioinformatics, a need to deal with multiple types of IP (database 
protection, copyright etc.).  
The most intense pressures currently experienced by the patent system are perhaps 
those endogenous to the system itself. First, the mentioned overlap between basic and 
applied research has been accompanied by the upstreaming of patentability. Starting 
from the '80s in the United States and slightly later in other developed countries, most 
notably European countries and Japan, patentability has been extended to encompass 
previously excluded technological domains, such as software, business methods and 
biological inventions. Patents in the latter domains tend to be granted for intellectual 
assets that might be far removed from a direct commercial application and close to the 
realm of pure science and abstract ideas. Second, and closely related to the first 
aspect, is the shading of the distinction between pure information and practically 
applicable knowledge from the perspective of patenting standards.  
The combination of the above two factors has deep consequences for the 
functioning of the patent system. For one thing, identification of the boundaries of 
patent rights tends to be harder than for patents covering downstream products not 
least because potential applications of patented upstream knowledge are generally 
unknown at the time of patent grant. This, in turn, increases the degree of uncertainty 
associated to the normal functioning of the patent system and brings about obvious 
consequences in terms of likelihood of patent litigation. Most importantly, the 
upstreaming of patentability in cumulative technological domains raises doubts as to 
the ability of the patent system both to ensure an adequate division of profits among 
successive innovators (i.e. to avoid excessive imbalances in favor of holders of 
upstream patents) and to impede that the early attribution of property entitlements 
entirely foreclose some streams of research. Concerns in this regard arise because 
many patents are now granted on objects that have no other use than as tools for the 
pursuit of further research and many of such patents, especially in the life sciences, 
cover discoveries and naturally occurring substances for which no close substitutes 
can be found.  
The relaxation of patenting standards constitutes a third source of tension 
endogenous to the patent system. Requirements analogous to the "inventive step" 
requirement of art.56 EPC or the "non-obviousness" requirement of section 103 
U.S.C. 35, but also the standards of utility and novelty embedded in most patent 
systems, are reportedly applied in a more lenient way than in the past (Barton, 2000; 
Dreyfuss, 1989; Lunney, 2001) in most developed countries. This is likely to result in 
a significant increase in the number of "trivial" patents granted over time, although 
accurate empirical estimates of the extent of such increase are hard to make and much 
of the concerns in this regard are raised on the basis of anecdotal evidence. The 
problems with the proliferation of trivial patents do not reside exclusively in the 
decrease of consumer welfare that is associated to the granting of monopoly rights 
over inventions that do not constitute genuine scientific or technical advancements. 
After all, the monopoly deadweight loss associated to patenting of "inventions" whose 
triviality makes them of scarce utility to the public is not likely to be substantial and 
judicial decisions may help to wipe out undesirable patents. Nonetheless, the 
proliferation of trivial patents is worth of attention primarily because of the feed-back 
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effects that may result from the increase in patent applications associated to low 
patentability thresholds. The more the applications, the higher the pressures put on 
patent offices, and the lower the quality of the patents granted. The most worrying 
effect of this vicious circle is thus the increased uncertainty innovators might face as 
regard the validity and enforceability of both their own and their competitors' patents. 
Low patentability thresholds may therefore end up bringing about an increase in 
transaction costs (and in particular negotiation and litigation costs) without a 
corresponding increase in incentives to innovate.  
The relaxation of patentability standards might also exert a negative influence on 
the effective performance of the patent system disclosure function. This is most easily 
discernible in relation to the patentability of the subset of biotechnology inventions 
made up by genetic inventions. Patent laws and regulations of most OECD countries 
tend to converge in this regard on a common ground according to which protection is 
granted to genetic material in so far as at least a single function of the gene or part of 
gene for which protection is claimed has been identified and is disclosed in the patent 
application. While this sort of utility requirement might not be problematic per se, the 
discrepancy between the inventive step effectively disclosed in the patent and the 
absolute nature of the protection the patent grants, which encompasses uses not 
described in the application, raises doubts as to the extent of information such patents 
are effectively able to convey.  
A fourth factor at the origin of the tensions currently experienced by patent 
systems worldwide is the trend towards the strategic use of IP assets. Relative to the 
past, patents are increasingly used as strategic weapons to obtain access to externally 
developed technologies or as defensive tools rather than as means to prevent direct 
imitation by competitors (Cohen et al., 2000). Patent rights are asserted more 
aggressively both in the context of firms' innovation strategies and in the context of 
revenue-raising licensing strategies (Rivette and Kline, 2000). This phenomenon, in 
conjunction with the rise in the costs of patenting (Allison and Lemley, 2002) and the 
costs of prosecuting patent litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2003) is likely to 
exert non-trivial effects on the effectiveness of the patent system as an instrument for 
the promotion of innovation. This is at least for a twofold reason. On one side, the 
increased relevance of the role of IP management strategies for firms of all sizes is 
likely to redirect firms' internal resources away from research and toward the 
administrative expenses necessary to enforce patent rights and negotiate licenses. This 
has proved to be a sensible strategy for firms such as IBM, Texas Instruments and 
Lucent Technologies, who have all experienced a marked change in attitude toward 
the management of their IP in the past two decades (Rivette and Kline, 2000). On the 
other side, some evidence exists that research patterns, especially those pursued 
predominantly by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), have been distorted by 
patenting patterns: investment in patent-intensive areas tends to be avoided in favor of 
less patent-crowded areas (Lerner, 1995). Of course the costs of litigation fall most 
heavily on small firms (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997), which has consequences for 
innovation that are hard to fully assess.  
Finally, starting from the '80s, the enactment of policies promoting recourse to 
patenting for the results of publicly-sponsored research has opened up a new set of 
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opportunities as well as problems for the patent system. The landmark event in this 
respect can be considered the issuance in the United Stated in 1980s of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, which strongly encouraged the patenting of federally funded research results by 
universities, small firms and public research organizations more generally.  The 
promulgation of this piece of legislation in the United States has not only spurred an 
internal debate that remains still unsettled (Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998; 
Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Colyvas et al., 2002; Rai and Eisenberg, 2003; Siegel, 
Waldman and Link, 2003), but has also encouraged many governments around the 
world to follow suit in various guises and with similarly uncertain outcomes.  
While the primary objectives of the bill – to encourage more effective technology 
transfer from public to private labs and to ensure that publicly-funded inventions are 
turned into useful commercial innovations – have surely their own merits, the 
evidence on the effectiveness of this policy move is so far mixed. For one thing, 
although most universities, both in the United States and in other developed countries, 
have proved ready to incur the administrative costs necessary to set up technology 
transfer offices and get into the IP management business, for most of them IP 
management costs are not outweighed by benefits in terms of licensing revenue, 
although closer links with industry through licensing often result in an increase of 
sponsored research whose extent is difficult to factor in the benefit-cost analysis of 
the consequences of the Act. 5 
Thorny issues arise also in other regards. The culture of "open science" distinctive 
of public research (Dasgupta and David, 1994) and Mertonian science more generally 
(Merton, 1973) is sometimes described as jeopardized by the new IP rules, with 
obvious consequences for the free dissemination of research results. Some 
modification of the scientific culture has perhaps taken place, especially in the life 
sciences, where research materials are withheld from public access more frequently 
than in the past and contractual agreements between university and industry often 
impose publication delays and/or the deletion of some information from publishable 
papers (Thursby and Thursby, 2002), but the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act are hard to 
disentangle from effects of a different origin.  Free dissemination is also claimed to be 
endangered by the exclusivity clauses contained in some licensing arrangements, and 
especially those concerning research tools subject to broad patent protection. 
Although some well-known cases such as that of the OncoMouse patent testify that in 
some instances these concerns are well-grounded6, the true extent of exclusive 
                                                
5 According to the 82 respondents to the Association of University Technology Managers' 1991 
and 2001 surveys, inventions disclosed increased by 84%, new patent applications by 238%, 
license agreements by 161%, and royalties by more than 520%. The distribution of both 
patenting activity and licensing revenues is, however, very skewed, with the top 10 university 
patent holders accounting for 66% of licensing revenues in 2000 (AUTM, 2003). 
6 The so-called “oncomouse” patent, covering genetically modified mice useful, among other 
things, for testing of anticancer drugs, was granted to Harvard University in 1988. Effective use 
of this patent has been severely restricted by the exclusive licensing agreement granted by 
Harvard University to DuPont, who has aggressively asserted her rights toward academic 
licensees, imposing restrictions on the use of the patent in industry-sponsored research and 
suing for infringement when licensing conditions were not respected.  
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licensing by public research organizations is hard to determine and some evidence 
exists that most licensing is non-exclusive (Henry et al., 2002).  
Another concern that has been raised in regard to the patentability of publicly 
funded research results is that a shift may occur in the research agendas of most 
public institutions away from basic research and towards applied, and more directly 
rewarding, research endeavors. The limited evidence available to date does not give 
substance to this concern (Mowery et al., 2001: Colyvas et al., 2002), although this 
possibility should probably not be dismissed too quickly. Lastly, the more intense IP-
orientation of public research institutions, by making less clear the distinction 
between pure and commercial research, has made it more difficult to sensibly define 
the extent of "research exemptions" to the enforcement of patent rights. This, in turn, 
has added an additional layer of complexity to the already broad range of currently 
debated "access issues" (Merrill et al., 2004).  
 
3. PATENTS, TECHNOLOGICAL REGIMES AND THE CURIOUS GAP BETWEEN THEORY 
AND EVIDENCE 
The discussion of the previous paragraph has highlighted a number of exogenous 
and endogenous tensions that are currently affecting most patent systems worldwide. 
Although it was not made explicit in the discussion, these tensions impinge to a 
different extent on different technological domains. This is a rather natural 
consequence of the more general observation that the patent system has a differential 
impact and effectiveness in different technological environments. The latter statement 
can be substantiated on the basis of a plethora of empirical studies conducted both in 
Europe and in the U.S. (Sherer et al., 1959; Taylor and Silberston, 1973; Mansfield, 
1986; Levin et al., 1987; Arundel et al., 1995; Harabi, 1995; Cohen et al., 2000; Arora 
et al., 2002). In spite of the abundance of empirical evidence, however, the theoretical 
discourse on the patent system has tended to proceed on the (implicit) assumption of 
the appropriateness of an all-encompassing approach. Questions concerning the 
factors likely to have a bearing on the differential role and effectiveness of patents in 
different technological domains as well as the varying degree of relevance of the 
various functions of the patent system in different technological regimes have not 
been particularly appealing to theorists. It is therefore questions of this sort that this 
section aims to tackle, starting from a broad-brush paint of the empirical evidence 
available to date.  
The mentioned empirical studies typically focus on the incentive function of 
patents and aim to assess the effectiveness of patents as inducements to innovate in 
different industries, often relative to other means of appropriation. The main findings 
of these studies include the observation that: (a) patents rank relatively low as 
appropriability mechanisms – in fact they are reported to be the least effective 
mechanism in most industries, although they are relatively more effective in 
industries such as medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, special purpose 
machinery, computers and autoparts (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al. 2000); (b) the 
absence of patent protection would have little or no impact on innovation in most 
industries, except pharmaceuticals (Mansfield, 1986); (c) firms in all industries rely 
on multiple appropriability mechanisms (exploitation of lead time, rapid movement 
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down the learning curve, secrecy, possession of complementary sale and service 
capabilities), often to protect the same invention (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 
2000); (d) both the reasons for patent protection and the intensity of reliance on other 
appropriability mechanisms differ across industries.  
A more direct measure of the payoffs from patent protection in different industries 
has been recently offered by Arora et al.’s 2002 study, based on data from the 1994 
Carnegie Mellon Survey. This study measures the “patent premium”, namely “the 
proportional increment to the value of innovations realized by patenting them” finding 
that, while in no industry besides medical instruments patents provide on average a 
positive expected premium net of patent costs, the premium for innovations that are in 
fact patented is substantial in many industries (a 50% increase relative to no patenting 
in most industries and up to 60% in health-related industries). Note, however, that 
both the conditional and the unconditional premiums differ greatly across industries.  
Some empirical evidence showing that the specific features of the transactional 
role played by patents differ across sectors also exists. In particular, Cohen et al. 2000 
survey underlines a distinction in this regard between “discrete” and “complex” 
product industries. The traditional role of patents as means to garner licensing 
revenues is more relevant in the first category of industries than in the second (37,5% 
of respondents report licensing as a motive for patenting in discrete product industries 
relative to a 28,8% in complex product industries). Also, within the first category of 
industries, the use of patents for licensing purposes is more common where patents 
are effective as appropriability mechanisms, notably in pharmaceuticals, while in 
discrete products contexts where patents are less effective in this regards they tend to 
be used as building blocks of “fences” of patented substitutes with the purpose of 
impeding the development of competing products. In complex product industries, by 
contrast, patents transactional function gains a strategic twist. In fact, the largest firms 
in these sectors are more likely than in other sectors to use them as bargaining chips 
in cross-licensing negotiations (54,8% of respondents in complex product industries 
use patents for this purpose, as compared to only 10,3% in discrete product 
industries), both as means to obtain access to external technologies and as means to 
prevent infringement suits.7  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the relevance of patent disclosures also varies 
across industries.8 European data analyzed by Arundel and Steinmuller (1998), for 
instance, show that the importance attributed to patent databases as a source of 
information is (perhaps unsurprisingly) correlated to the sectoral propensity to patent.  
 The short review of empirical evidence provided in the first part of this 
paragraph was meant to give an intuition of the fact that the role performed by patents 
                                                
7 Note, however, that the distinctions traced are not completely clear-cut and there is some 
degree of heterogeneity within sectors. The use of patents for negotiations, for instance, is 
relevant also to a handful of discrete products industries such as pharmaceuticals, steel and 
metal products. 
8 Of course the effectiveness of patents disclosure function varies greatly across national patent 
systems. For instance, for a comparison between the U.S. and the Japanese patent systems see 
Cohen et al., (2002).  
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varies greatly across sectors. In the remainder of this paragraph, we will attempt to 
identify factors that are likely to impinge both generally on the role of patents in 
different technological regimes and, specifically, on the relative importance and 
effectiveness of the different functions patents play in different technological 
domains. We take as a starting point of our analysis the notion of technological 
regime, first introduced by Nelson and Winter (1982) as a way to characterize the 
knowledge environment in which firms operate and later refined by Malerba and 
Orsenigo (1996, 1997). The attributes relevant to the definition of technological 
regimes – opportunity, cumulativeness, appropriability and the knowledge base 
(Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996, 1997) – are, however, spelled out in detail and 
complemented by additional attributes we deem salient to the analysis. It is for this 
reason that we will use interchangeably the terms “technological regime”, 
“technological domain” and “technological environment”.  
First, consider the set of factors that goes under the label of appropriability 
conditions, namely conditions affecting the ease of protection of the results of 
innovation from appropriation by competitors. Of course, differences in 
appropriability conditions across sectors impinge mainly on the differential relevance 
of patents incentive function in different sectors. To this category of factors can be 
ascribed, first of all, the costs of imitation in absence of patent protection. It is 
firmly established in the conventional wisdom of intellectual property theory that the 
lower the costs of imitation of a given technology, the more relevant is the incentive 
role played by IPRs. Such conventional wisdom seems well-grounded on the 
empirical observation that, in industries characterized by high R&D costs and ease of 
imitation such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals and machinery, patents do tend to be 
valued highly as an appropriation mechanism (see the above-mentioned empirical 
studies).  
Further, the degree of substitutability of patented technologies (or, in other 
words, the ease of inventing around patented technologies) affects the effectiveness of 
the incentive function performed by patents. The degree of substitutability typically 
varies across different technological domains and tends to be lower in those domains 
such as the life sciences where patents often cover naturally occurring substances and 
discoveries rather than inventions strictu sensu9. In principle, a low degree of 
substitutability of patented technologies should reinforce the effectiveness of the 
incentive function. It is surely so for sectors where difficult-to-invent-around patents 
mostly cover end products as it is the case, again, in pharmaceuticals. However, the 
effectiveness of patents incentive function is more difficult to assess in those sectors 
where scarcely substitutable patented technologies mostly constitute inputs into 
further research. In these contexts, such as software and biotechnology, innovators 
generally find themselves both in the position of licensors and licensees and the net 
effects of patents on incentives is harder to evaluate. Under such circumstances, a low 
                                                
9 Note, however, that the fact that patents in some domains cover naturally occurring substances 
does not imply per se that such patents cannot be invented around. To take the example of 
biotechnology, it should be considered that there are in general multiple ways of treating the 
same disease and that the same result may therefore be achieved in different ways.   
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degree of substitutability of patented technologies might imply imbalances in the 
division of profits between subsequent innovators, with detrimental effects on 
incentives and might also play a role in putting under strain the effective performance 
of patents transactional function, as the “anticommons” story (Heller and Eisenberg, 
1998) suggests.    
Finally, the effectiveness of alternative appropriation strategies can be also 
included in this set of factors. Clearly, the more effective are appropriation strategies 
other than patents, the more limited is the incentive function the latter perform in 
different technological domains. The effectiveness of non-patent mechanisms of 
appropriation is partly dependent on the nature of the production process. 
Technological domains characterized by high investment costs and a relatively high 
importance attributed to possession of complementary capabilities tend to rely on 
mechanisms such as lead time, rapid movements down the learning curve and secrecy 
more intensively than on patents.  
A second set of factors relates to the nature of the R&D process. The structure 
of R&D costs constitutes a particularly relevant factor to differentiate among 
technological domains. The more capital-intensive the R&D process is in a given 
technological domain, the more relevant patents’ incentive function tends to be in 
such domain. Note, however, that there might be instances in which IPRs are not 
sufficient to recover costs but it would still be desirable from a social welfare point of 
view to induce innovation, so that we observe a failure of patents incentive function10. 
The incentive patents provide tends to play a less central role in labour-intensive 
contexts such as software development. When the major input into R&D is given by 
human creativity, it might well be the case that a mixture of non-patent related 
incentives (both monetary and non-monetary) suffices to induce innovation. In 
software, this happens not only in innovative environments openly averse to patents 
such as Free/Open Source software communities, but also where innovators profit 
more from the provision of complementary services and assistance than from the 
direct sale of innovations.  
Another factor relevant to the distinction among different domains is given by the 
costs associated to the testing of innovative results. In some technological domains, 
such costs can be shifted upon willing users and therefore need not be recouped 
directly by the innovator. We refer here, again, to the software domain, where the 
open source development model has demonstrated the viability of an innovation 
process in which such shift does occur. In other technological domains, by contrast, 
testing costs depend on the need to abide by biosafety and biosecurity regulations 
(reference is made here to the life science domain) and testing costs cannot be shifted 
on to consumers because of obvious concerns for public health.  
The degree of uncertainty of the innovation process is also a relevant element 
of distinction among technological domains. Uncertainty surely strengthens the 
                                                
10 Maurer and Scotchmer (2004) suggest that this might be the case for “big science” projects 
such as those aimed at the obtainment of energy through nuclear fusion. In the latter case, the 
social value of the innovation clearly exceeds its commercial value appropriable under IPRs 
protection.  
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relevance of the incentive function – the pharmaceutical industry being the 
prototypical example of a highly uncertain innovative domain where incentives would 
be significantly undermined absent patent protection.11 Uncertainty also raises the 
relevance of the disclosure and signaling functions. Patent disclosures become 
especially relevant in technological domains characterized by pronounced uncertainty 
and a high degree of technological diversity (Rosenberg, 1976; Nelson and Winter, 
1982), namely in presence of a high number of possible technological trajectories 
along which the process of technological learning takes place. This is because of the 
role patents play in signaling promising directions of research and therefore in 
lowering, to some extent, firms’ R&D uncertainty. It is, indeed, not coincidental that 
the relevance of patent databases as information sources is highest in fields 
characterized by significant uncertainty such as the life sciences (Arundel and 
Steinmuller, 1998).  
As for the function performed by patents in signaling firms’ competencies and 
capabilities so as to attract financing, it is worth noting that its importance tends to be 
significant especially in those contexts where uncertainty contributes to confer a 
crucial role to forms of relational financing such as venture capital that, relative to 
other forms of financing, display an advantage in performing a screening and 
monitoring function with respect to competing innovative projects (Aoki, 2001; 
Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Note that the link between uncertainty of innovation, 
venture capital financing and patents’ role in sustaining innovative activities is worth 
of particular attention. In addition to signaling firms’ innovative potential, patents 
sustain the relationship between investors and innovators in that they ensure effective 
disclosure of the innovators’ technologies reducing the likelihood of misappropriation 
by the investor more effectively than simple non-disclosure agreements. Most 
importantly, patents do influence investors’ confidence in contexts of risky and 
uncertain innovation where profitability is initially really low, sales and revenues are 
slow to rise and firms that don’t pay any dividend can pay investors only through 
capital gains. In so doing, patents ensure an adequate flow of funds toward innovative 
activities that would find difficulties in exploiting other sources of financing. Luckily, 
this seems to result in a positive effect on innovation, as shown by recent empirical 
estimates of the venture capital-innovation link (Kortum and Lerner, 2000)12. 
The pace at which innovations occur in a given technological domain also 
affects the role patents play in such domain. In particular, patents disclosure function 
                                                
11 According to estimates provided by PhRMA, the trade association of U.S. pharmaceutical 
firms, uncertainty is so high that only one in five efforts lead to the successful delivery of a 
product. Moreover, only 30 per cent of those drugs that successfully reach the market produces 
revenues that exceed costs (PhRMA, 2003).  Independent estimates report that it takes on 
average 10-15 years and about $800 million of expenditures to bring a drug from the 
conception stage to FDA approval (DiMasi et al., 2003).  
12 Kortum and Lerner (2000) show not only that venture capital activity has had, in the United 
States, a significant impact on the rate of patenting, but also that it has had a strong positive 
impact on innovation. Their estimates suggest that “venture capital, even though it averaged 
less than 3% of corporate R&D from 1983 to 1992, is responsible for a much greater share – 
about 8% - of U.S. industrial innovation in this decade” (Kortum and Lerner, 2000, p.675).  
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might be to some extent undermined in contexts of rapid technological innovation, 
where patent-revealed information that is made available much later than the time of 
invention might turn out to be scarcely valuable once it reaches its potential users. 
This is typically the case of the software sector, where patent databases are deemed 
rather useless as a source of information and rarely consulted (Aharonian, 1998). 
Moreover, in technological domains characterized by a rapid pace of innovation some 
problems might arise as regards the effectiveness of patents incentive function. 
Indeed, the lengthy patent grant procedure may not satisfy the need for protection 
when it is felt the most and the statutory length of patent protection of 20 years may 
not balance correctly the incentives of successive patent holders because initial patent 
holders may tend to get a grasp on innovations far removed from their initial 
contribution.  
To conclude the list of factors inherent to the nature of the R&D process, consider 
the organization of R&D. In this regard, it should be noted that the role performed 
by patents in enabling transactions is particularly important in those technological 
domains where R&D is conducted predominantly in a collaborative fashion. The 
existence of IPRs covering knowledge inputs contributed by firms or institutions 
collaborating to a common research endeavor is often indispensable in the initial 
phases of technological cooperation because it reduces the risk of involuntary leakage 
of proprietary knowledge (see, among others, Powell, 1996). Moreover, the rules of 
attribution of IPRs over the research results of the common project crucially affect the 
parties’ innovation incentives (DeLaat, 1997).  
A third set of factors likely to influence the role and relevance attributed to patents 
in different technological domains is given by the nature of technology. This 
category of factors includes the complex/discrete nature of the technology developed, 
the degree of technological cumulativeness, the degree of technological modularity 
and the relevance of issues of technological standardization.  The first factor – the 
degree of technological complexity - has deep consequences for the use that is made 
of patents in different technological environments, as was mentioned when reviewing 
Cohen et al.’s 2000 empirical study. In complex technological areas patents tend to be 
used less to prevent imitation and more as tools to enable transactions. This is partly 
because complex products are more difficult to replicate and partly because in the 
case of complex technologies the relationship patents to innovation is generally a 
many-to-one relationship that makes it harder to appropriate through IPRs the value 
of innovations, while making it easier to exercise hold-up threats on competitors 
(Bessen, 2004), especially through the strategic accumulation of patent portfolios.13 
More conventional uses of patents characterize, by contrast, discrete products 
industries.  
The degree of technological cumulativeness refers to the extent to which present 
technological knowledge lays the foundation for future advancements. 
Cumulativeness may be observed at different levels, namely at the technological, 
firm, sectoral and local levels (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000). The property of 
                                                
13 Acs and Audretsch (1988) show that the number of patents per innovation can vary 
substantially, ranging by industrial sector from an average of 49 to 0,6 patents per innovation. 
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cumulativeness at the firm level might be considered a primary determinant of the 
specific trajectories firms follow over time according to their developed 
competencies, organizational capabilities and learning dynamics. Thus, considered at 
this level, a high degree of cumulativeness tends to improve appropriability 
conditions and therefore might imply a more limited role attributed to patents. 
Moreover, cumulativeness at the firm level might also reduce the effectiveness of 
patents transactional function, as it might imply a need for direct, face-to-face 
interactions to overcome problems of technological “stickiness” (von Hippel, 1994) 
and to effectively transfer technologies in domains different from those in which they 
were created.  
When cumulativeness is considered at the technological or sectoral level, 
however, the effects of this property on the role patents perform and on the efficiency 
properties of the patent system more generally are less clear-cut. While it might still 
be the case that a high degree of technological cumulativeness improves 
appropriability conditions and thus decreases reliance on patents as incentive tools, 
patents’ transactional role might be enhanced in those highly cumulative contexts 
where next generation technologies are not necessarily developed by the initial 
innovators due to the peculiar configuration of the other technological and market 
factors. In other words, when technological cumulativeness does not confer 
significant advantages to firms exploiting cumulativeness at the firm level because, 
for instance, development of a given technology requires knowledge and 
competencies in areas unrelated to the firm’s cumulative pattern of development, 
transfer of technologies and, possibly, of know-how tends to rely more intensively on 
patents as enablers of transactions than would otherwise be the case. While patents 
transactional function might be enhanced in contexts of high technological 
cumulativeness, however, the latter puts under strain patents incentive function. 
Indeed, when innovations build upon each other in a highly cumulative fashion, 
appropriate patent design becomes crucial to ensure a division of profit among 
subsequent innovators that provides adequate overall incentives to innovate (see the 
survey by Scotchmer, 1999).  
The third factor – the degree of technological modularity – has a less clear-cut 
effect on the role played by patents. The attribute of modularity refers to the 
decomposable nature of a given technology (Simon, 1962): a complex system can be 
defined as modular if it is decomposable in a number of components or subsystems 
that are relatively independent but still concur to support the functioning of the whole. 
Modules can be highly complex and interdependent within, but are connected through 
interfaces that tend to be standardized so as to minimize communication costs 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Technological modularity might have two contrasting 
effects on the role patents play in a given technological domain. On one side, both the 
transactional and the signalling functions of patents might become more relevant than 
in presence of a non-modular technology. Indeed, patents may be one essential 
precondition for the development of  innovative processes characterized by the ex-
post combination of modules of technology developed independently by autonomous 
innovators. This is the case, for instance, of the Silicon Valley model nicely described 
by Aoki (2001). On the other side, technological modularity may also constitute one 
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essential ingredient of a process of distributed innovation such as the Free/Open 
Source software phenomenon in which patents play no role and are, actually, vividly 
opposed. Modularity has, in the latter context, the effect of sustaining a system of 
non-monetary, non-patent-induced incentives14 that represents, in turn, the basis of a 
model of innovation that has demonstrated so far a high degree of vitality. It is 
important to note that, in both cases, the degree of technological modularity should be 
considered an endogenous attribute. The process of modularization involves costs as 
well as benefits (see, e.g., Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001) and the degree of 
technological modularity should thus be considered the outcome of an intentional 
choice over the trade-off between the static and dynamic costs of setting up a modular 
architecture and the benefits in terms of flexibility of product/component change, 
economies of scale and increased product variety. 
Consider, finally, technological standardization. In technological regimes where 
standardization plays an important role, the role of patents as transactional tools is 
generally enhanced. Indeed, patent pools and cross-licensing tend to be more easily 
attained when significant standardization issues are involved, as it is in the 
telecommunication and computer industries, although this might involve antitrust 
concerns (Shapiro, 2001). When standards are in existence or are in the process of 
being implemented, it might be easier to identify a restricted set of essential patents to 
be included in a pool and transactional problems are more easily overcome. 
The diverse role and relevance of patents in different technological regimes is also 
affected by a fourth set of factors, associated to the nature of the knowledge base 
essential to innovation. One important factor of this sort is given by the relevance of 
fundamental knowledge to a given sector and the distance between fundamental 
knowledge and its application. Given the observed trend towards the upstreaming of 
patentability in current patent systems of developed countries, the role of patents both 
as incentive mechanisms and as transactional tools is currently becoming more central 
to innovative strategies in sectors where the distance between fundamental knowledge 
and its concrete translation into innovative results is substantial. Indeed, the greater 
such distance, the greater will tend to be the investment required to implement new 
technologies and thus the greater the relevance played in a given sector by patents’ 
incentive and transactional functions. At the same time, however, it should be noted 
that, on one side, it is exactly in presence of knowledge well upstream of commercial 
application that patents incentive function might fail and might need to be 
complemented by non-patent incentives such as direct public sponsorship and, on the 
other side, that the transactional role of patents tends to display its most pernicious 
defects in such technological domains. This is partly because valuation biases and 
                                                
14 Adoption of a modular technology sustains a system of non-monetary, non-patent-induced 
incentives in that it: (a) facilitates the identification of individual contributions, and thus 
contributes to sustain a system of non-monetary incentives based on reputation and peer-
recognition that has an analogous in the academic environment; (b) allows a form of division of 
labor that is consistent with intrinsic motivations because it does not involve repetitive tasks but 
rather the performance of a multiplicity of tasks on the same module; and (c) reduces the extent 
of incentives necessary to induce individual contributions (Benkler, 2002). 
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other sorts of transactional hurdles tend to be most thorny when patents cover 
upstream knowledge (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). In addition to this, patent 
transactions in technological regimes of this sort often take the form of exclusive 
licensing, which is generally claimed by firms as indispensable to induce a sufficient 
amount of innovative investment. One of the problems with exclusive licensing of 
upstream knowledge is that, while scientific advances increase the level of 
technological opportunities for all firms in a given technological domain, exclusive 
licensing restricts the number of firms to which such opportunities are effectively 
available.15 This might be of concern when there is strong uncertainty as to the 
direction of research that would most effectively ensure that novel scientific 
inventions are translated into useful innovations and many innovative efforts are thus 
preferable to a single one. In other words, the characteristics of IPRs exchange when 
patented knowledge is well upstream of commercial application may negatively 
feedback on incentives, reducing the effectiveness of patents incentive function. 
As for the other attributes of knowledge that might be of relevance, it is worth 
mentioning those singled out by Winter (1987), namely observability, tacitness, 
complexity and the systemic nature of knowledge. Observability refers to the amount 
of knowledge that is disclosed by using the knowledge itself and has obvious 
consequences for the incentive function performed by patents. Similarly, the degree of 
systemicness and/or tacitness of the knowledge involved by innovation in a given 
technological regime also affects the ease with which innovations can be imitated. 
Knowledge that is remarkably systemic in nature might both increase and decrease 
patents incentive function. On one side, a high degree of systemicness tends to 
decrease the relevance of the role patents play because it imposes a need for 
possession of complementary assets in order to successfully enter the industry (Teece, 
1986). On the other side, it might increase patents’ relevance because strategic 
patenting of such complementary assets might become a relevant part of firms’ 
innovation strategies in this kind of innovative environments. As for knowledge 
tacitness, it might diminish the relevance of both the incentive and the transactional 
role of patents; the first because it enhances the effectiveness of appropriation 
mechanisms such as lead time and secrecy, the second because it decreases the 
effectiveness of market-based forms of knowledge transfer relative to more direct 
means such as direct interactions and inter-firm circulation of researchers.  It should 
be noted, however, that patents might in some instances constitute an important 
precondition for the exchange of tacit knowledge (Arora, 1995), especially if one 
considers that tacitness should be considered not so much as an inherent property of 
knowledge, but rather as a property of knowledge at least partially endogenous and 
dependent on the prevailing economic incentives (Cowan et al., 2000). 
To conclude, consider the set of factors related to the nature of the market. One 
obvious factor to consider is the size of the market for the innovation. In some 
technological domains it is more common than in others that patents incentive 
function fails because the size of the market underlying some innovations is small and 
                                                
15 This issue has been recently the subject of a rather heated debate in connection with the 
evaluation of the effects of the Bayh-Dole act in the United States.  
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does not provide a sufficient incentive to invest yet the social value of such 
innovations would justify research expenditures. This is, for instance, the case of the 
life sciences sector, and of orphan drugs and vaccines for diseases affecting mostly 
populations in less developed countries more precisely.  Another obvious factor that 
should be taken into account is market structure. However, statements about the 
relationship between the role of patents and the structure of the market are at least as 
difficult to make as statements on the long-standing question of the relationship 
between innovation and market structure. Perhaps it is only possible to highlight the 
observed regularity that patents transactional role tends to be most effective in 
concentrated industries such as the semiconductor industry, where the limited number 
of players has favoured the development of effective cross-licensing strategies (Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001). Finally, the nature of competition in the market (the relative 
importance of price versus being cutting-edge) is also likely to have an impact on the 
importance attributed to patents as inducements to innovate in different technological 
domains.  
Table 1: Main factors affecting the role and effectiveness of patents in 
different technological regimes 
Appropriability conditions • Costs of imitation in absence of patent 
protection 
• Degree of substitutability of patented 
technologies 
• Effectiveness of alternative appropriation 
strategies 
• Nature of the production process 
Nature of the R&D process • Structure of R&D costs 
• Capital-/labour-intensity of the R&D process 
• Degree of uncertainty of the innovation process 
• Pace of innovation 
• R&D organization 
Nature of technology 
 
• Degree of technological complexity 
• Degree of cumulativeness 
• Degree of technological modularity 
• Relevance of issues of technological 
standardization 
Nature of the knowledge 
base 





Nature of the market • Size of the market 
• Market structure 




4. “ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL”: THE RATIONALE FOR TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC 
TAILORING OF INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE. 
Technological regimes do not differ only in relation to the role and relevance of 
the different functions of IPRs. Most importantly, they differ as to the nature of the 
limits the IPRs system encounters in performing such functions and to the nature of 
the remedies available to confront these shortcomings. In this section, to make the 
discourse more concrete we will exemplify these differences by reference to the life 
sciences and the software domains. We understand the life sciences domain to include 
technologies related to agricultural, biological, medical and health-related research, 
according to the National Science Foundation (NSF) science and engineering field 
classification. The discussion will, of course, only scratch the surface of the issues 
involved, but will help us make the point that some tailoring of incentives to 
innovation to different technological regimes is, indeed, indispensable. Section five 
will then provide an overview of the ways in which this might be achieved.  
There are some important similarities between software and the life sciences. 
These concern, in particular, the nature of technology and the nature of the knowledge 
involved in innovation in the two technological domains. Indeed, innovation in both 
sectors depends heavily on upstream knowledge – algorithms and fundamental results 
in physics, mathematics and electrical engineering in the case of software, naturally 
occurring substances and genetic information in the case of the life sciences. 
Moreover, technology is characterized in both cases by a high degree of complexity 
and cumulativeness: inventions build sequentially on each other and are linked by 
relationships of complementarity. Finally, to some extent in both technological 
regimes technology can be modularized and large, complex projects can be broken up 
in multiple relatively independent subprojects. The scope for modularization tends, 
however, to be greater in the software domain, as shown by the success of large 
F/OSS projects such as the Linux operating system, than in the life science domain, 
where large-scale innovative efforts are often excessively difficult to modularize.  
The differences between the two sectors we consider are, perhaps, even more 
apparent than similarities. First of all, the ease with which innovations can be imitated 
in absence of patent protection constitutes an important element of differentiation 
between the two sectors. Software is, as a practical matter, extremely prone to 
imitation by exact duplication of the object code because of the negligible costs of 
this sort of operation. However, the availability of both legal (copyright and trade 
secrets) and non-legal (lead time, learning lags, possession of complementary assets) 
alternative forms of protection of innovation significantly improves appropriability 
conditions (Liebeskind, 2000). In the life sciences, and in particular in the biomedical 
domain, lead time, secrecy and learning lags do not constitute effective 
appropriability mechanisms, in part because firms must comply with a lengthy 
regulatory process that implies significant disclosure, and the range of legal 
instruments available is more limited than in software.16 Within the life sciences, 
                                                
16 Note, however, that outright imitation is more difficult in the life sciences than in the 
software domain because simple access to a given molecule does not necessarily imply the 
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however, it is perhaps possible to trace a further distinction in this regard between 
ease of imitation of small molecule new chemical entities (NCEs, developed by 
pharmaceutical firms) and of biopharmaceuticals (predominantly developed by 
biotechnology firms). According to some (see, e.g., Grabowski, 2002), the former are 
to be considered more prone to imitation than the latter, due mainly to the greater 
difficulties involved in efficient-scale manufacturing of biopharmaceuticals relative to 
NCEs and to greater regulatory hurdles.  
Second, the degree of substitutability of patented technologies also differs 
between the two sectors, in that patented inputs more akin to the realm of discoveries 
than to that of inventions tend to be particularly difficult to invent around and their 
functions are predetermined by nature, rather than by human ingenuity.  
Third, differences exist also with regard to the nature of the R&D process. 
Reliable and comparable data are, indeed, difficult to gather on R&D in the two 
sectors, due to definitional and aggregation problems. Data provided for the U.S. by 
the National Science Foundation for  FY2001, for instance, show that absolute R&D 
expenditure levels reach $13 billion in the software publishing industry and $9 billion 
in computer systems design and related activities, while R&D expenditure levels 
amount to around $15 billion in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors17. 
Actual R&D expenditures in the two sectors might, however, substantially diverge 
from the reported data, given that the latter only include companies with an estimated 
total R&D of above $5 million (NSF Science and Engineering Indicators, 2004). 
Moreover, intersectoral R&D comparisons should more meaningfully be based on the 
ratio of R&D costs to sales rather than on absolute R&D levels. Their limitations 
notwithstanding, these data might provide an indication of the fact that conventional 
distinctions between software and the life sciences based on R&D intensity tend to 
fade away as R&D expenditures in software increase.18 Three important differences 
between the two sectors might be traced with regard to R&D: (a) the costs of 
innovation in software are made up predominantly by labor costs, measured in month-
programmer units, while innovative activity in the life sciences requires significantly 
                                                                                                                
ability to replicate it at negligible costs, in absence of information concerning the protocol and 
the conditions of chemical synthesis.  
17 These data include biotechnology R&D expenditures categorized under the label of 
“scientific R&D services”, which fall within the non-manufacturing sector and biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical R&D expenditures, falling within the manufacturing sector.  
18 The National Science Foundation Science and Engineering Indicators underscore the 
stunning increase in software R&D investment reporting that “[i]n 1987, when an upper-bound 
estimate of software and other computer-related services R&D first became available, 
companies classified in the industry group "computer programming, data processing, other 
computer-related, engineering, architectural, and surveying services" performed $2.4 billion of 
company-funded R&D, or 3.8 percent of all company-funded industrial R&D. In 2001 the 
company-funded R&D of a comparable group of industries (excluding engineering and 
architectural services) was greater by a factor of 10 and accounted for 13.2 percent of all 
company-funded industrial R&D.” 
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more intense capital investments;19 (b) the “D” aspect of the R&D process takes place 
relatively rapidly in software while absorbing considerable time, capital and efforts in 
the life sciences;20 (c) the degree of uncertainty associated to innovative activity is 
also much more pronounced in the life sciences than in software: biomedical 
innovation constitutes, in particular, the prototypical example of the high-cost, high-
risk innovative activity21. 
Fourth, the organization of R&D activities displays remarkably different 
characteristics in the two domains. Innovation in the life sciences tends to occur on 
the basis of a three-layered market dynamics that roughly reflects a distinction 
between basic research, still predominantly conducted in public laboratories although 
increasingly less so, explorative applied research, conducted by biotech firms, and 
delivery activity (including clinical development and commercialization), 
accomplished primarily by large pharmaceutical companies (see, e.g., Orsenigo et al., 
2001). The sector is replete with both ex-ante and ex-post collaborative agreements 
and inter-firm and public-private interactions abound. The extent of such interactions 
is comparatively more limited in the software field, although inter-firm relationships 
are currently on the rise (Blind et al., 2001) and basic research plays as fundamental a 
role as in the life sciences (CSTB, 2003). What is worth mentioning here is, however, 
that we do not observe in software the same kind of division of labour between 
research, development and commercialization that is observable in the life sciences. 
More generally, the organization of R&D activities in software reflects a long-
standing custom of firms’ self-reliance according to which needed components are 
generally developed from scratch in-house rather than acquired on the market.22 
                                                
19 A distinction should be made, however, between mass-market software and specialized 
software. Innovation in the first segment is becoming more and more capital-intensive due in 
particular to the costs involved in gathering information on the characteristics of consumers’ 
demand so as to better tailor innovation to consumers’ needs.  
20 To be precise, the bulk of software development costs is made up by debugging costs, which 
should be included in the development cost category. Nonetheless, development is much more 
rapid in software than in the life sciences, where development of a given innovative product 
takes an average of 10 to 15 years to complete in the case of the creation of new vegetable 
varieties and an average of 10 years (4 to identify a new molecule and 6 to 8 years to develop 
it) to release a new medical product (Joly and Ducos, 1993). 
21 Conventional estimates of success rates of innovative efforts in the pharmaceutical industry 
indicate that, typically, less than 1 percent of the new compounds object of pre-clinical 
investigation reach the human testing stage and that only around 20 percent of compounds 
going through the clinical trials ultimately gains FDA approval (DiMasi, 1995). In addition to 
the uncertainty related to the medical effectiveness of new drugs, there are also uncertainties 
related to market success. The distribution of returns to R&D for new drug introductions is, 
indeed, highly skewed, with few blockbuster drugs accounting for most of the returns 
(Grabowski et al., 2002).  
22 See, for instance, Samuelson et al., (1994). The practice of software reinvention is generally 
seen as extremely wasteful. Indeed, in the mid-nineties acknowledgement of the waste from 
foregone opportunities of software reuse led to the endorsement of specific software reuse 
programs by the U.S. Government (Lemley and O’Brien, 1997).  
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The nature of the venture capital-patents link also differs in the two technological 
domains. While venture capital constitutes an important source of innovation 
financing in both domains (PWC MoneyTree™ Survey, 2004), at least one key 
difference should be acknowledged. Patents are much less effective in helping to 
attract venture capital investors in the early stages of innovation (seed capital and 
start-up financing) in software than in biotechnology. Empirical studies of the venture 
capital/patents link in the software sector both in the U.S. (Mann, 2004) and in 
Germany (Blind et al., 2001) show that patents do not perform as effectively as in the 
biomedical sector their signaling function. The results for the U.S. indicate that 
“patents are not often useful in helping the early-stage software company demonstrate 
the sustainable differentiation from its competition that is the focus of the venture 
investor” (Mann, 2004), though they may play a role in later stages. As for Germany, 
Blind and colleagues clearly state that “the theory that patents facilitate market access, 
above all for young companies, could not be confirmed” (Blind et al., 2001). These 
results may perhaps be explained on the basis of a threefold observation. First, in 
software one can find no trace of the uncertainty-venture capital-patents link that is 
acknowledged to be crucial to biotechnology innovation financing (BIO, 1994), 
among other things because of the lower degree of technological uncertainty 
characterizing the software sector and the short length of product life cycles. Second, 
differently from biotechnology, a single patent does not offer in software any real 
protection against competitors, in that end-products may comprise large numbers of 
(patentable) functionalities. This implies, in turn, that software patents do not sustain 
investors’ expectations as effectively as biotechnology patents. Third, and related to 
the previous observations, there is the fact that sustaining the enormous costs of 
patent enforcement hardly constitutes a sensible strategy for capital-constrained 
software SMEs, especially if one takes into account the short product life cycles that 
characterize the sector.  
Sixth, another important difference between the two technological fields concerns 
the relevance of issues of standardization, interoperability and network effects – 
pervasive in the software domain and almost irrelevant to the life sciences. On these 
issues we will, however, come back later.  
Finally, the extent to which economic actors rely on patents still varies 
considerably across the two domains, although the IT field has registered in the past 
decade a stunning increase in patent propensity rates. According to one study (Hicks 
at al., 2001), IT patents per R&D dollars have increased in the U.S. from an average 
of 0,28 to 0,48 between the periods 1989-1992 and 1993-1996.  These figures should 
be compared to an increase from 0,23 to 0,24 in health-related technologies. Similar 
results are reported by the study of intellectual property protection in the U.S. 
software sector conducted by Graham and Mowery (2002), which also underlines that 
large packaged software firms are substituting patents for copyright. The increase in 
patent propensity rates characterizes, however, disproportionately more large firms 
than small firms, as shown by one statistical exploration of 1700 publicly quoted U.S. 
and Canadian software companies representing half of the world industry (Chabchoub 
and Niosi, 2004) and by the mentioned study based on a survey of the German 
software sector (Blind et al., 2001). In the life sciences, by contrast, both large and 
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small companies value highly patent protection as an appropriability mechanism, as 
previously noted.  
 
Table 2: Main similarities and differences between software and the life sciences. 
= Reliance on upstream knowledge = 
= Degree of technological complexity = 
= Degree of technological 
cumulativeness 
= 
= Possibility of technological 
modularization 
= 
= Absolute levels of R&D spending  




both large and 
small firms 
Patent propensity rates High for large 
firms, low for small 
firms 
High 
(lower than in 
software) 
Ease of imitation absent patent 
protection 
High 
Low Effectiveness of alternative forms of 
protection 
High (alternative 
forms of legal 
protection available) 
Low Degree of substitutability of patented 
assets 
Generally high 
High Degree of uncertainty of the R&D 
process 
Low 
High Ratio of capital costs to labor costs Low 
High Relevance of the venture capital-
patent link in financing innovation 
Low (especially 
in the start-up fase) 
High Informative role of patent databases Low 
 
Not only the two technological domains we consider differ as regards the 
characteristics of innovative activity but they also differ, as mentioned, as regard the 
most critical aspects of the functioning of the IPRs system. Consideration of these 
aspects has led some scholars to question the very desirability of patent protection for 
both software-related and biotechnology inventions. The latter issue is, however, 
outside the scope of this paper. In what follows, we will take for granted the current 
state of IP regimes in developed countries and thus the availability, by and large, of 
patent protection for both biotechnology and software-related inventions and we will 
identify the most pressing concerns that are currently raised in connection to the 
operation of the IPRs system in the two technological domains. The discussion 
constitutes a prelude to the exploration of the way in which such concerns might be 
addressed, pursued in the next section.  
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Before addressing technology-specific issues, however, it is worth directing our 
attention to one issue common to both technological regimes – that of patent scope.23 
There is widespread concern that patents with an excessively broad scope are being 
issued both in software and the life sciences. In the life sciences, claims to 
biotechnology inventions have been analogized to claims to chemical compounds for 
the purposes of patentability. What this means is that biotechnology patents and, in 
particular, the controversial subset of genetic patents, can be claimed both as 
processes and as products (material compounds) and their scope is therefore 
essentially determined by nature, given that product per se claims confer absolute 
protection for all the uses of a product.   
Genetic inventions deserve special attention in this regard. In most developed 
countries patents covering nucleotide (DNA or RNA) sequences that may encode 
genes or fragments of genes are granted provided the sequences are isolated from 
their natural source and at least one potential application of the genetic information 
has been identified. The scope of protection, however, is not limited to the utility 
disclosed in the application and extends to uses not indicated in the original patent, 
though new uses might be patented (“dependent” patents). The broad scope accorded 
to genomics patents causes a number of concerns (Bar-Shalom and Cook-Degan, 
2002).  As mentioned in section 2, gene patents may not perform effectively their 
disclosure function, due to the discrepancy between the extent of protection and the 
actual content of patent applications. Moreover, concerns are often voiced in relation 
to the discrepancy between the rewards implicit in patents with broad coverage and 
the costs of innovation in genomics. Indeed, recent technological innovations in 
genomic sequencing (e.g. robots and automatic sequencers) have reduced at least by a 
factor of five the costs of genomics research relative to its infancy and most 
innovative efforts amount to routine activities, which leads to question the need for 
substantial rewards in order to induce innovation.  Finally, the discrepancy between 
the inventive step effectively disclosed in patent applications and the extent of 
protection also causes fears of possible imbalances of incentives between early 
innovators and subsequent developers. Given that isolating and characterizing a gene 
can hardly be considered a “pioneering invention” and that the costs of the underlying 
research are low, there are reasons to question, in light of IP scholarship, the 
appropriateness of broad patents and even of patents more generally in this context 
(Scotchmer, 1991, 1999; Henry et al., 2003).  
As for the software domain, Cohen and Lemley (2001) have argued at great 
lengths that software patents are likely to be very broad if no special measure is taken 
to narrow their scope. These two authors, together with others (Samuelson, 1995; 
Warren-Boulton, Baseman and Woroch, 1995), have also advanced reasons why it 
might be wise to construct patents for software-related inventions narrowly. One of 
the main arguments they propose in support of this view is that a policy that attributes 
                                                
23 The economists’ notion of patent scope or patent “breadth” usually refers to the extent to 
which substitute inventions must differ from the patented invention in order not to be 
infringing. For a more nuanced characterization of the notion of patent breadth and a distinction 
between “leading breadth and “lagging breadth” see O’Donoghue et al. (1998). 
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strong protection to pioneer inventors is not appropriate to an industry characterized 
by networked, interdependent products. In such a context, according strong protection 
to pioneer inventions may encourage the realization of larger rather than smaller 
changes to existing programs, which may induce a pattern of innovation “by leaps and 
bounds” that reduces social welfare because of reduced interoperability and reduced 
testing of programs (Cohen and Lemley, 2001).  
A more general argument in support of narrow patent protection for software has 
to do with the likelihood of bargaining failures in the software domain. The literature 
on cumulative innovation has shown that appropriate patent design is critically 
dependent on the ability of private parties to contract around their property 
entitlements in order to rearrange assigned rights in privately and socially beneficial 
ways (Gallini and Scotchmer, 2001). Whether broad patents are efficient thus depends 
on whether efficient licensing will take place, allowing follow-on improvers to build 
on previous innovations. Bearing this in mind, an argument for narrow patents in the 
software field can be constructed on the basis of the fact that the heterogeneous and 
dispersed nature of industry players, the frequency of new entries and the fine-grained 
nature of inventions constitute impediments to contracting that are likely to make 
broad claims suboptimal.  
The problem of patent scope in these two technological domains is made more 
acute by the ever more critical issue of decreasing patent quality (Kahin, 2003). 
Although accurate assessments of the quality of patents granted are difficult to make 
because of the difficulty of definition of the relevant metric, there is a widespread 
perception that quality has been decreasing in recent years (Lemley, 2001). This is 
partly due to administrative problems: patent offices of developed countries seem to 
be experiencing difficulties in keeping up with the surge in patent applications. 
Workload pressures have increased everywhere and the increased complexity of 
patent claims, often requiring interdisciplinary knowledge to be examined, has 
generated an unsatisfied need for ever more qualified personnel (Allison and Lemley, 
2002). This, in turn, allegedly translates into decreased patent quality. The same effect 
is often attributed to a reported more lenient application of non-obviousness standards 
both by patent offices and by courts (Barton, 2000; Hall, 2003b). The proliferation of 
trivial patents, confirmed to some extent by anecdotal evidence, compounds the 
problems created by the attribution of broad patent claims in the software and 
biotechnology domains because of the uncertainty it adds to the functioning of the 
patent system in these fields.  
Turning now to technology-specific issues, in the rest of this section we will 
consider in turn the most salient concerns currently raised in relation to the operation 
of the patent system in the life sciences and in software. 
 
Life Sciences  
A great part of the issues relevant to the life sciences domain relates to instances of 
failure of patents transactional function and can be categorized under the broad 
heading of access issues. Along with these issues, an important instance of failure of 
patents incentive function also deserves attention: the case of orphan drugs and, more 
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generally, of research on drugs for which the size of the underlying market does not 
constitute a sufficient inducement to invest. 
Failures of patents transactional function may occur for two reasons. Efficient 
transations may not take place, on one side, because of difficulties in the aggregation 
of a high number of fragmented patent rights and, on the other side, because of 
undesirable contractual behavior of patent holders. The first case is that identified by 
Heller and Eisenberg’s metaphor of the “tragedy of the anticommons” and refers to 
situations in which “multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a 
scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use” (Heller and Eisenberg, 
1998; see also Parisi et al., 2004). In other words,  an excessive fragmentation of 
patent rights, such as that resulting from the patentability of genes, genetic material 
and in particular of expressed sequence tags (ESTs), prevents coherent aggregations 
of rights that are essential to the pursuit of further research and innovation. Property 
rights fragmentation multiplies transaction costs and results in the building up of a 
“tollbooth” on future innovation due to “royalty stacking” – an extreme manifestation 
of the complements problem first identified by Cournot (Shapiro, 2001). This 
situation might be particularly pernicious because of the involvement in biomedical 
innovation of a large number of heterogeneous actors, both public and private, which 
exacerbates transactional difficulties associated to asymmetric information and 
valuation problems (Eisenberg, 2001) and brings to the forefront the issue of access to 
patented assets by budget-constrained public institutions.  
The few empirical accounts of the “anticommons” phenomenon available to date 
tend to confirm the existence of growing concerns by both private and public actors 
over their ability to successfully pursue the negotiations necessary to access patented 
inputs essential to their research (National Institute of Health, 1999; OECD, 2002; 
Walsh et al., 2003). At the same time, however, they also highlight the (often 
successful) efforts of researchers to overcome transactional difficulties by finding 
“workable solutions”. These solutions include working around the claims, challenging 
patent validity and intentionally or unintentionally infringing patents that can 
potentially block future research. It would thus seem that there are few instances in 
which bargaining breakdowns have effectively occurred and the hypothesis that the 
increasingly complex IP landscape is slowing down biomedical innovation was not 
confirmed by the mentioned studies. Nevertheless, the increase in costs due to royalty 
stacking should not be underestimated. One notable case is that of the Malaria 
Vaccine Initiative, pursued by the not-for-profit international institution Program for 
Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH). The project was intended to sustain the 
development of vaccines for some forms of malaria affecting predominantly 
developing countries but, before it could really set off, its initiators have had to 
confront a jungle of 22 partially overlapping patents related to the antigene MSP-1, 
spending considerable time and money in the enterprise (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2002).24  
                                                
24 A similar instance of overlap of patent rights is that concerning the pursuit of research on the 
GoldenRice, namely a technology aimed at enriching vitamin A content of rice. According to 
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As mentioned, a second source of failures in the effective performance of patents 
transactional function relates to patent holders unilateral contractual practices. There 
are at least three forms of contractual behavior that merit attention. The first case is 
that of refusals to license or, more generally, of circumstances in which patented 
assets are exclusively exploited by patent-holders. This is, of course, a perfectly 
legitimate way in which a patent holder may decide to exploit the exclusive rights 
patents grant. However, the fact that patents in life sciences innovation often cover 
inventions well upstream of commercial application makes this behavior potentially 
undesirable from society’s standpoint because multiple efforts exerted by agents with 
heterogeneous abilities and research objectives will in general be more effective than 
a single effort exerted by a given patent holder at searching the space of potential 
applications of the patented upstream knowledge.  
The second case is that of exclusive licensing. Again, it is not the legitimacy of 
such practice that is in question, but rather its impact on the progress of research in 
the life sciences. The more upstream is the knowledge that is licensed exclusively, the 
greater the concerns exclusive licensing raises, because of the magnitude of potential 
applications exclusive licensing curtails. Moreover, an additional concern arises here 
because of the possibility that exclusively licensed patents are offered at a prohibitive 
price. This is a concern especially relevant to the provision of genetic testing services 
(Schissel et al., 1999).  
The third case regards patent or contractual provisions such as reach-through 
claims and grantback clauses. Reach-through claims are increasingly inserted in 
patents covering research tools, i.e. markers, assays, receptors, transgenic animals and 
other patented elements whose main form of utilization is as inputs into further 
research and development. Reach-through claims extend patent protection to products 
that are “identified by” the patented tool or method, so that patent holders hold rights 
to royalties on the sale of innovations that involved the use of the patented research 
tool to come into existence.25 Grant-back clauses, on the other hand, are clauses 
granting licensors of patented technologies the option to acquire exclusive or non-
exclusive licenses over or even outright ownership of patented technologies 
eventually realized with the help of their research tool. This sort of contractual 
practices allows early innovators to leverage their patent rights into future innovations 
for which their contribution may or may not be relevant, given serendipity of 
research. Fears about reach-through claims and grantback clauses arise, however, 
mostly because of the transaction cost burden multiple negotiations over routine 
methods, material and data impose (Eisenberg, 2001). Licensees may find themselves 
in the difficult situation of having to grant multiple exclusive licenses on their future 
discoveries in order to obtain access to essential research tools as they go along with 
their research and this might discourage the pursuit of promising research endeavors.  
The instances of failure of patents transactional function that we have just recalled 
                                                                                                                
one study, more that 70 patents, held by about a dozen patent holders, impinge on this 
technology (ISAA,  2000). 
25 For an overview of the issues related to the licensing of research tools, see the 1998 report of 
the NIH Working Group on Research Tools. 
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affect both pursuit of research and commercialization of innovations. The adverse 
consequences for commercialization might be attributed mostly to problems of 
property rights fragmentation. These problems are not peculiar to patent protection 
and may arise also in fields where the dominant form of legal protection is different 
from patents, as it is the case for the sui generis protection of databases.26 
The impact on research might be threefold. Indeed, research patterns might be 
distorted in patent-crowded areas by fears of infringement and “anticommons”-like 
problems. Lerner (1995) empirically confirms this hypothesis in biotechnology as do 
Walsh et al. (2002), Merz at al. (2002) and Cho et al. (2003) in their survey-based 
studies. Secondly, some research avenues might be effectively blocked by one of the 
problems discussed above. Third, the recalled transactional failures might imply 
wasteful duplication of innovative efforts, as it might be suggested by the birth of a 
significant number of new companies specializing on the legal circumvention of 
patents on genes or genetic molecules. These companies (Sangamo BioSciences, 
Athersys and Transkaryotic Therapies, to make a few examples) are developing 
technologies that allow to change the expression of the patented gene inside the body 
or cell, with a process called “gene switching” or “endogenous activation” (Stix, 
2002). Note, however, that these circumvention efforts might also generate useful 
innovations in addition to duplications of existing technologies.  
All of these problems merit particular attention in the realm of genetic testing 
services, where patent holders’ contractual practices have already frequently raised 
concerns about costs and limitations of access to tests of the genetic predisposition to 
diseases. This is not only detrimental because it cuts on the number of providers of 
clinical testing services but also because it limits the scope for improvement of the 
tests (Merz, 2000) and the possibility to compare a given service with its alternatives 
(Caulfield et al., 2000). Some notable cases in this regard involve the American 
company Myriad Genetics, holding rights to the diagnostic tests for the two genes 
BRCA1 and BRCA2, relevant to the diagnosis of breast cancer. The company has so 
far applied very high per-test fees (over 2500 USD) and imposed very stringent 
licensing conditions, such as for instance the requirement that all testing be performed 
in their own laboratories, and has aggressively prosecuted non-compliant licensees. 
As a consequences, strong public opposition has set off in many OECD countries, 
including France (Cassier and Gaudillière, 2001), the United Kingdom (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2002) and Canada. Another relevant case concerns a patent on a 
method of diagnosis for a rare genetic disorder called the Canavan Disease, held by 
the Miami Childrens’ Hospital. In this case, parents’ associations succeeded in 
reversing patent holders’ policy of exclusive licensing and in substantially reducing 
licensing fees.  
                                                
26 Maurer and Scotchmer (1999) highlight the possibility that the commercialization of new 
databases requiring data gathered from multiple existing databases might be stymied by the 
need to contract with a very high number of right-holders. They conclude (p.1130): « Finally, 
scientists could decide that acquiring all of the rights needed to build a particular database 
isn’t worth the effort. Some biotechnology databases would have to negociate more than 100 




Turning now to software-specific issues we would like to highlight a few issues that 
are either technology-specific or that tend to be more prevalent in software than in 
other technological domains. One such issues concerns the relationship between 
patent protection and other forms of IP. As mentioned in section 2, software is 
peculiar in that copyright, patents and trademarks are all relevant to the protection of 
the same products and technologies. Recent empirical evidence on litigation has 
shown, for instance, that these means of protection are complements, rather than 
substitutes in the software field (Graham and Somaya, 2004), although it should be 
noted that small firms are much more likely to rely exclusively on copyright 
protection (Oz, 1998; Tang et al., 2001). Software creations share some characteristics 
of literary works, and are thus amenable to copyright protection, and some 
characteristics of useful machines, as such prone to patent protection (Samuelson et 
al., 1994). Copyright protects the expression of a given program and is thus useful to 
prevent outright imitation of one’s innovative effort, while patents protect the 
function the program performs and therefore provides protection against non-literal 
imitation and the development of substitutes performing the same function. 
Trademarks, in turn, play a role in setting in motion the sort of “bandwagon effects” 
widespread in networked industries, by allowing the easy identification of logos and 
symbols associated to given would-be standards.  
The complementarity between different forms of IP protection might raise some 
concerns as regard the possibility of an excess of protection. The patent-copyright 
interface is, in particular, worth of attention. In principle, patents ensure protection 
also against outright copy and therefore provide a form of protection equivalent to 
copyright. The overlap between the two forms of protection might generate 
uncertainty as to the effective scope of protection each grants (Samuelson et al., 
1994). Moreover, certain limitations to the scope of copyright protection that have 
developed over time to make copyright protection more suitable to the software field, 
as for instance the provision allowing for reverse engineering of copyrighted 
interfaces (see e.g. art. Directive 91/250/EC) have so far found no analogue in patent 
law, although scholars have suggested the opportunity to introduce a right to reverse 
engineering in patent law (Cohen and Lemley, 2001; Samuelson and Scotchmer, 
2002; Burk and Lemley, 2003). In addition to this, it is worth noting that the 
relationship between secrecy and patent protection might be characterized by 
interesting twists not present in other technological domains. Indeed, it might be the 
case that the availability of patent protection in its current form will have the effect of 
increasing, rather than reducing secrecy, as the disclosure rationale for patent 
protection would suggest. This is because there is at present no explicit requirement to 
disclose a patented invention source code. By making available their source code, 
patent-holders would thus facilitate competitors’ search for proof of infringement, 
while not gaining any appreciable benefit (Smets-Solanes, 2001).  
Next, consider the issue of interoperability. Innovation in software is not only 
sequential and cumulative (Bessen and Maskin, 2001), but is also characterized by 
complex horizontal interdependences: the social value of a software innovation is 
often realized only in combination with other programs performing different 
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functions. In particular, when two programs are complementary, their joint social 
value is greater than the value of the two programs taken separately and it becomes 
thus important to ensure that the two programs have compatible interfaces or, in other 
words, to ensure interoperability. When patent protection extends to program 
interfaces, however, the question of interoperability might become thorny. On one 
side, patent protection of interfaces might facilitate the division of rents through 
licensing between incumbents and entrants, while absent patent protection incumbents 
may be more reluctant to disclose their interfaces. On the other side, however, 
patentability of interfaces may determine either situations of complete blockage 
resulting in the presence on the market of incompatible programs, or situations in 
which patent holders are able to leverage their power over independently created 
innovations and can thus appropriate a share of the rents disproportionate with respect 
to the social value of the interface (Caillaud, 2003).  
The issue of network externalities also deserves a few comments. Software 
technology is characterized by the presence of network externalities: the value of a 
given product to users increases with the number of other users of the same program, 
due mainly to benefits in terms of the ability to communicate and exchange files.27 In 
markets with network externalities, competition tends to take a peculiar aspect. There 
is a tendency towards concentration and the dominance of a single product and new 
entrants may successfully enter the market only in so far as they are able to “tip” the 
market establishing themselves as dominant products (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 
1985). This poses a problem in regard to patent protection. Indeed, one may wonder 
whether legal protection is needed at all in these circumstances in which lead time and 
market penetration constitute particularly effective appropriation mechanisms. A 
positive answer may be suggested by the fact that patent protection, by impeding 
direct competition from alternative technologies performing functions analogous to 
the already established program, avoids socially undesirable oscillations among 
alternative technological platforms. Having said this, however, it should be noted that 
patent protection also tends to reduce product variety in networked industries and may 
impede the establishment of superior but infringing technologies.  
Finally, the software domain seems more prone than other technological domains 
to patent portfolio races and the emergence of patent thickets (FTC, 2003). This 
depends, in part, on the complex set of interdependencies linking software programs 
that necessarily determines partial overlaps among legal rights. Indeed, a new 
software program is likely to infringe multiple existing patent rights when it comes 
into existence. In such context, building a portfolio of patents on related technologies 
may both protect firms from potential hold-ups and provide a means of limiting entry 
by competitors. While, however, the accumulation of patent portfolios may be one 
way around the problems posed by patent thickets, it may also contribute to enhance 
such problems by contributing to the building up of the thicket of overlapping patent 
rights.  
There are additional reasons why patent thickets and anticommons problems 
                                                
27 However, see Dam (1995) for a critical view on the presence of network externalities in 
software.  
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might be especially thorny in software. First, it might be particularly difficult to 
determine the exact boundaries of software patents, among other things, because of 
the lack of detailed disclosure requirements. Second, the proliferation of trivial 
patents is a phenomenon affecting software to a greater extent than other 
technological domains both because of a lack of accessible collections of prior art and 
because of the inherent indeterminacy of the non-obviousness (inventive step) 
standard. Third, software patent databases are rarely used as a source of information 
and firms in the software industry are even advised to refrain from consulting them to 
avoid charges of willful infringement. This, of course, raises the likelihood of 
inadvertent infringement.  
The empirical evidence gathered so far suggests that the phenomenon of patent 
thickets appear as a tangible one in the software domain. One recent study of the ICT 
sector confirms the increased relevance relative to the past of these patenting 
strategies (Scheelan et al., 2004). This study (the OECD/BIAC survey) finds, among 
other things, that more than three-quarters of the ICT firms surveyed now patent 
technologies they would not have patented one decade ago, even if patentability was 
then unrestricted. Another study, by James Bessen and Robert Hunt (2003), suggests 
not only that software patents are particularly “cheap” to obtain and that they are 
generally acquired for the purposes of building patent thickets, but also that greater 
use of software patents is associated to lower R&D intensity.28 A majority of panelists 
in the FTC hearings on competition and intellectual property also provided evidence 
to support the existence of patent thickets, stressing that strategies of defensive 
patenting associated to the building up of patent thickets tend to divert resources away 
from innovative activities (FTC, 2003).  
One voice out the chorus is that of Ronald Mann, who has forcefully rejected the 
“myth” of a software patent thicket on the basis of interviews conducted among 50 
industry executives (including software developers, venture capitalists, lenders etc.) in 
the United States (Mann, 2004). While the latter study aims to demonstrate the 
usefulness of patents to software SMEs, however, it ends up showing that the lack of 
patents constitutes a danger ever more prominent for SMEs in a world in which large 
firms can avail themselves of large patent portfolios. 
 
5. HOW CAN TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC TAILORING OF INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE BE 
IMPLEMENTED? 
 
The preceding section was meant to illustrate the point that some tailoring of 
incentives to innovate to different technological regimes is indispensable by 
presenting the specificities of innovation and patent protection in software and the life 
sciences. In this section, we consider how innovation incentives may be adjusted to 
take into account the commonalities and the differences highlighted in the previous 
                                                
28 It should be noted that Bessen and Hunt’s (2003) study uses a comprehensive database of 
patents on inventions using software, that corresponds to a very broad definition of “software 
patents”. For this and other reasons the paper has been subjected to many criticisms. See, in 
particular, Hahn and Wallstein (2003).  
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section. The question of the opportunity to tailor IP incentives to different 
technological domains has long been debated and emerges periodically whenever new 
technologies need to be accommodated within existing IP systems, as it has been the 
case for semiconductors, software and the life sciences. The argument against 
technology-specific tailoring of incentives rests on three main building blocks: 
information costs, administrative costs and agency costs. Indeed, the adjustment of 
innovation incentives to different technological domains is generally discarded as too 
informationally demanding. The administrative costs entailed by a system in which 
technological specificities are taken into account are described as excessive. Agency 
costs in the form of rent-seeking activities are judged as insurmountable obstacles.  
While we agree that this sort of costs exerts, indeed, real effects on the scope for 
technology-specific tailoring of incentives, we submit that strong aversion to 
technology-specific adjustment of incentives may only result from a fundamental 
confusion concerning the means through which the latter should be implemented. 
Indeed, it is the implicit assumption often made that adjustment of incentives 
necessitates the enactment of technology-specific statutes that suggests the conclusion 
that it would impose excessive costs and would not ensure the flexibility needed to 
keep up with the progress of technology. Acknowledgment of the fact that 
technology-specific tailoring of incentives to innovate may be achieved through 
means other than the crafting of specific statutes significantly undermines the case 
against incentive tailoring. The same conclusion is suggested by the fact that 
informational constraints might be made less binding by the identification of some 
regularities in the requirements for protection of different technologies. There are no 
valid reasons to believe that IP incentives should not be adjusted on the basis of the 
available information so as to ensure that the social benefits stemming from a given 
set of incentives adopted in the different technological domains outweigh the social 
costs the provision of these incentives imposes.  
As mentioned, technology-specific tailoring of incentives to innovate may be 
achieved through various means. One obvious way is to exploit the flexibility inherent 
in the legislative crafting and judicial interpretation of IP law. Some flexibility is 
achieved by according different forms of IP protection to different subject matters. 
Patent protection, copyright, trademark legislation, trade secrecy, database protection 
and sui generis forms of protection such as the COV (certificat d’obtention vegetale 
of the UPOV) all reflect some degree of technology-specific differentiation present in 
IP law. Moreover, within each of the above forms of IP protection, many policy levers 
are available to ensure additional flexibility in the treatment of different technologies 
(see below).29 In the case of patents, in particular, technology-specific adjustment of 
protection mostly revolves around a differentiated treatment of patentability 
requirements and the determination of the appropriate scope of patent protection.  
Other means include, of course, provision of incentives in ways not involving 
private appropriation of innovations, as it is the case for various forms of public 
sponsorship of both basic research and product innovation. These constitute 
                                                
29 Burk and Lemley (2003) analyse, for instance, the policy levers available to U.S. patent law 
and make a case for the introduction of additional policy levers not currently used. 
 33 
instruments of technology-specific tailoring of incentives in so far as they allow to fill 
up technology-specific needs not effectively addressed by IP-based incentives, as it is 
the case, for instance, for the promotion of scarcely appropriable basic research in 
science-based regimes.  
Antitrust intervention constitutes another means through which some tailoring of 
incentives might be implemented, even though this may not result immediately 
apparent. Ideally, intellectual property laws should be designed in a way that takes 
into account the market structure in which innovators operate, so as to ensure a 
correspondence between extent of protection and costs of innovation. In practice, 
adjusting the statutory terms of IP protection to market structure is unfeasible, as 
length is fixed and courts and patent offices are not required by law to make 
economics-based judgements when determining the breadth of patent rights. Indeed, 
to our knowledge there is at present only one piece of IP legislation that explicitly 
takes into account the costs if innovation in determining the opportunity to grant IP 
protection. We refer here to the Database Directive passed in Europe in 1996, 
explicitly linking protection to the investments made in database construction.30 
Given that incentives cannot be made to reflect market structure through IP 
legislation, it is important to ensure that this sort of link is effectively established 
through antitrust intervention. The latter has the merit of taking place ex-post, when 
market-specific needs become apparent, and of being based on detailed factual 
examination of the specific circumstances of the case. Antitrust application of the rule 
of reason thus constitutes an essential means through which rewards can be tailored to 
innovative effort and a market structure conducive to innovation might be preserved. 
Of the many forms of antitrust intervention, in the present context it is particularly 
worth recalling those that impinge most on the “access issues” above recalled. 
Antitrust intervention is likely to be an especially important instrument in 
technological regimes where these issues more frequently occur, in particular through 
its role in calibrating its attitude towards cross-licensing and patent pools and through 
the imposition of compulsory licenses in application of the essential facility doctrine. 
In what follows we will consider, first, possible forms of intervention suitable to 
address needs common to both software and the life sciences but distinguishing these 
from other technological domains and then instruments directed at addressing the 
specificities differentiating each of the two domains. As was mentioned in section 4, 
software and the life sciences share some technological traits, and in particular the 
complex and cumulative nature of the knowledge base essential to innovation and the 
relevance of upstream knowledge to productive and innovative activities. These 
factors, as clarified in section 3, affect the role and performance of patents in the two 
technological domains. The first – the high degree of technological complexity and 
cumulativeness characterizing both software and the life sciences – impacts on the 
effectiveness of patents transactional function and constitutes a precondition for the 
emergence of the “anticommons” and “patent thicket” phenomena described above. 
Some antidotes to the emergence of these phenomena have already spontaneously 
appeared in both technological domains in the form of private initiatives aimed at 
                                                
30 Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. 
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reconstructing the public domain (Merges, 2004; Reichman and Uhlir, 2003). 
Free/Open Source software represents one such initiative, based on the decentralized 
efforts of a great number of software developers (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Benkler, 
2002; Rossi, forthcoming). Unilateral initiatives by large firms have also been 
undertaken in order to address concerns for the adverse consequences of the excessive 
“fencing” and fragmentation of scientific knowledge, especially in the pharmaceutical 
domain.31 The extent to which these private initiatives may effectively substitute for a 
policy expressly requiring disclosure of public research results is, however, difficult 
to assess on the basis of the present knowledge. Other forms of intervention are thus 
called for. One possibility is that of enacting transaction-promoting policies either in 
the form of a lenient antitrust attitude or through more proactive policies aimed at 
inducing cross-licensing and the formation of patent pools, as it has sometimes been 
the case in history.32 Another possibility is to reconsider the role played by research 
exemptions, of course with a view at avoiding that innovation incentives be 
undermined.  
The first solution seems to us relatively more applicable to the software domain 
than to the life sciences domain, essentially in consequence of the differential role 
standardization issues play in the two technological environments. This makes it 
harder to identify the limited set of patents that might be worth including in each pool. 
Moreover, the upstream nature of the knowledge assets at issue exacerbates valuation 
and thus transactional difficulties. Finally, incentives for players to contribute their 
intellectual assets to a common pool might not be particularly strong in an 
environment in which patents are often the principal source of strategic advantage. 
Indeed, we are not aware of the existence of any patent pool in bioscience so far. A 
case for the promotion of patent pools can, however, be resurrected in circumstances 
in which the above-mentioned problems are not binding (Marks et al., 2001) and 
especially in domains at the intersection between computing and the life sciences (e.g. 
in bioinformatics).  
The second solution – an enhanced role attributed to research exemptions – might, 
on the contrary, be more apposite for addressing anticommons-related issues in the 
life sciences domain than in the software domain. In the life sciences, two factors 
concur to make “anticommons” problems most thorny: uncertainty surrounding the 
value of the object of IP transactions and the heterogeneity of transacting actors that 
include public along with private agents. Research exemptions might play a role in 
mitigating the effects of both of these factors. Indeed, they may improve access 
conditions for public institutions and, if cleverly crafted, they may allow bargaining to 
take place when most uncertainties on the value of a given patented innovation to its 
potential users are resolved.  
"Research exemptions" are crafted in significantly different ways in different 
countries. While the real extent of the exemption is, of course, a matter of 
                                                
31 One notable example is the creation of the Merck Gene Index, a publicly available database 
containing research results obtained by Merck Pharmaceuticals on EST sequences and 
associated clones for the uniquely expressed human genes.  
32 For historical examples in this connection, see Merges and Nelson (1990). 
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interpretation, it appears that Europe tends to be more lenient in this regard, perhaps 
also because the boundaries between public and private research are still less fuzzy 
than in the U.S.33 The scope for invigorating the experimental use defense in patent 
law is, however, large on both sides of the Atlantic. Several proposals have been 
advanced in this direction, starting with Eisenberg’s (1989) important contribution 
and showing that the problem of the appropriate design of research exemptions is all 
but trivial and that a relevant risk exists that inappropriate design might undermine 
incentives.34 In spite of their drawbacks, solutions requiring an enhanced role for the 
experimental use defence have the advantage of addressing directly the problems 
connected to the interface between public and private research in the life sciences 
domain.   
A third (partial) solution not previously mentioned and applicable in both the 
software and the life sciences domains concerns the application of patentability 
standards by both patent offices and courts. In particular, the non-obviousness 
(inventive step) standard has been recently applied too leniently to ensure that 
“anticommons” and “patent thicket” problems are not exacerbated by floods of 
patents of dubious innovative content. By ensuring a high non-obviousness threshold, 
at least this aspect of the anticommons problem could be mitigated. This positive 
effect would add to a more general one emphasized by recent economic scholarship 
with regard to technologies characterized by a rapid pace of innovation. According to 
Hunt (1999), a high non-obviousness threshold may be especially apposite in these 
circumstances because of the characteristics of the trade-off between decreased 
likelihood of obtaining a patent and increased patent value the choice of a high non-
obviousness standard engenders.35 
                                                
33 In the United States, research exemptions have been traditionally interpreted very narrowly, 
allowing for non-infringing uses of the invention only insofar as the researcher's purpose is that 
of "philosophical enquiry". A recent Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' decision, Madey v. Duke 
University, has further eroded the extent of the exemption, by specifying that it does not apply 
to activities conducted in the contest of the normal "business" of a research institution, either 
for-profit or not-for-profit. In Europe, acts "done privately and for purposes which are not 
commercial" and acts "done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the 
invention" are shielded from liability. 
34 See, among others, Gitter (2001), Mueller (2001), O’Rourke (2000), Strandburg (2004). An 
especially interesting proposal has been advanced by Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss (2003) and 
slightly modified by Richard Nelson (2004). This proposal envisages the institution of a waiver 
that researchers at public institutions might invocate when they are denied access to patented 
assets on reasonable terms. The waiver would imply the possibility of using the patented 
technologies without permission but would deny researchers the option of patenting their 
research results and would impose them an obligation to promptly publish the latter. 
35 There is a substantial degree of consensus on the general opportunity to implement a high 
non-obviousness standard. Merges (1992) argues that a high patentability requirement may 
favour the development of larger and riskier innovations in circumstances in which markets 
would promote the relaization of innovations with more certain rewards. A similar argument is 
developed by O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), who suggest that a high non-
obviousness standard may create incentives for firms to seek larger innovations and thus 
increase R&D. Moreover, Scotchmer and Green (1990) have argued that a high non-
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The second trait shared by the two technological regimes – the critical relevance 
of upstream knowledge to innovative activity – generates, by and large, two sorts of 
needs for tailoring of incentives. The first relates to the deepening of the transactional 
problems that often go under the label of access issues. The second relates to the 
inadequacy of patent incentives to induce a socially desirable amount of investment in 
basic research.  The instruments that have been generally relied upon to address the 
second concern – public funding of research through the establishment of public 
research institutions, funding of university research, grants and procurement – has 
traditionally also played a role in addressing the first concern through the application 
of the rule of disclosure characteristic of “open science” (Dasgupta and David, 1994). 
Reliance on public sponsorship in circumstances in which IP does not constitute an 
effective appropriability mechanism might have various advantages with respect to IP 
in that it allows not only to extend the range of potential beneficiaries of the 
knowledge created (Mowery et al., 2001; David, 2003) but also to coordinate the 
research effort by aggregating relevant information in a more efficient way than that 
allowed by the decentralized system of IP incentives (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004). 
While the function patents perform in signalling the most promising avenues for 
research implies that information is made available after substantial investments have 
been incurred, often after “winner-takes-all” races have occurred, the immediate 
public disclosure associated to public sponsorship might be a more effective way of 
exploiting knowledge externalities. This holds, of course, provided the rule of 
disclosure is not abandoned, as it seems to be increasingly the case (see section 2). 
As for the elements of divergence between the two domains, we will now go back 
at the issues highlighted in section 4 to consider what instruments might be 
appropriate to address these technology-specific concerns and thus tailor incentives to 
the needs of the two different technologies we consider. With regard to the life 
sciences, two main issues need being tackled. The first concerns the transactional 
failures associated to unilateral contractual practices of right-holders (refusals to 
license, exclusive licensing and restrictive contractual clauses) and the second the 
failure of patents incentive function in circumstances in which the size of the market 
for an innovation is too small to support adequate IP-based incentives yet there are no 
doubts as to its social value. To be sure, the first issue is not entirely peculiar to the 
life sciences. In the life sciences domain, however, it is exacerbated by the low degree 
of substitutability of many patented assets involved in the cumulative patterns of 
innovation characterizing the sector and particularly of genetic inventions. This 
factor, while deepening transactional difficulties, might justify solutions based on 
recourse to compulsory licensing in application of the essential facilities doctrine. In 
fact, three conditions contribute to the legal definition of essential facility: a) the 
presence of an essential input (an input that is both indispensable to production or 
innovation and difficult to reproduce); b) control of the input by a firm in a dominant 
                                                                                                                
obviousness standards may provide firms incentives to race and the race accelerates progress. 
On the other hand, Denicolò has reversed the latter argument emphasizing the “winner-takes-
all” race that may result from a high standard determining an excess investment in major 
innovations.  
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position; c) lack of plausible technical reasons to refuse access to the input. In 
presence of these three circumstances compulsory licensing may be thus relied upon 
as a way to help fine-tuning the division of profits among subsequent innovators and 
provide a means of ex-post intervention when the incentive imbalances common in 
cumulative innovation settings occur. Indeed, in addition to being explicitly 
recognized by the TRIPs Treaty, compulsory licensing has been proven not to have 
statistically significant effects on firms’ propension to innovate (Sherer, 1998). 
The second issue, having to do with an instance of failure of patents incentive 
function, finds its prototypical example in the case of pharmaceutical innovation 
directed at the treatment of neglected diseases or diseases affecting predominantly 
developing countries. Patents are not as effective appropriability mechanisms in this 
situation as they are in pharmaceuticals more generally for various reasons.  These 
include: a) a “time consistency problem” related to the fact that governments have 
incentives ex post to use their power to lower the price of drugs to levels not 
sufficient to cover research costs, which undermines ex ante research incentives; b) a 
“free rider problem” associated to the fact that pharmaceutical research represents a 
global public good and small countries may not take into account the consequences of 
a failure to contribute; c) a “size of the market” problem connected not only to 
developing countries’ budget constraints but also to the fact that most pharmaceuticals 
for developing countries diseases (and vaccines in particular) are likely to be under-
consumed  (see Kremer, 2002).  
Incentives might thus more accurately be tailored to the needs of this market by 
relying on mechanisms other than patents. Public sponsorship should, however, take a 
different form than that it takes in the promotion of basic research. This difference is 
due to the fact that in the present situation the need to be addressed is known in 
advance, which makes it easier to implement incentives that require verification of 
performance standards, while in the case of basic research research objectives are 
typically not known in advance (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2004). The debate on the 
best way in which incentives might be provided in such circumstances is, however, 
far from settled, given both theoretical considerations on the disadvantages of each 
incentive form and consideration of the obstacles to their practical implementation. 
With regard to software, three main concerns were underscored in section 4 as 
specific to this technological regime. The first is the possibility that existing IP 
instruments confer to software innovations an excessive degree of protection, both as 
a result of the overlap of the different forms of protection and as a result of the 
discrepancy between the statutory length of patent protection of 20 years and the 
speed of technological progress and short life cycles characterizing software 
innovation. One way in which incentives might be adjusted, suggested from time to 
time in the course of debates on software patentability, is through a reduction of 
statutory patent length. However, while this solution constitutes indeed the staple diet 
of economic scholarship on IPRs36, its practical implementation may find a limit in 
                                                
36 The economics literature has extensively considered how patent incentives might be adjusted 
in socially desirable ways (though generally without explicit reference to specific 
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the fact that, unless an agreement were reached in the competent international fora, 
unilateral initiatives by States in this direction would probably undermine the trend 
toward international patent standardization set in motion by the TRIPs agreement. An 
even more radical solution may consist in denying patent protection altogether to 
software-related inventions, as suggested by open source lobbyists as well as by some 
well-known economists (David et al., 2003). In between, there is the possibility of 
crafting the details of patent protection for software inventions in a way that takes 
explicitly into account the specific features of software innovation while not 
undermining the general uniformity of patent law. This brings us to the remaining two 
issues highlighted in section 4. 
The question of interoperability constitutes a second technology-specific issue that 
might be addresses in various ways. Indeed, determining the appropriate scope of 
protection of program interfaces is not an easy task, if anything because of the 
difficulty of determining the boundaries between a given program and its interfaces. 
The task of avoiding that patent protection of program interfaces allow right-holders 
to extract rents disproportionate with respect to the real innovative contribution of the 
patented software products might be addressed in various ways. One option might be 
that of recurring to compulsory licensing in application of the essential facility 
doctrine. The major drawback of this option resides, however, in the high transaction 
costs involved in the determination of the appropriate “reasonable terms” at which 
interfaces should be licensed. A second option consists in allowing for reverse 
engineering of interfaces, though this involves wasteful expenditures in software 
decompilation that might sometimes inhibit the obtainment of interoperability. Third, 
there is the possibility of imposing the publication in patent applications of the 
description of program interfaces, which appears not to imply the costs involved by 
the alternative solutions described. 
Finally, there is the question of the limited disclosure function patents perform in 
the software domain. Addressing this issue is important for a variety of reasons that 
range from ensuring that software patent databases are useful to software innovators 
to mitigating the adverse consequences of patent portfolio races. Ways should thus be 
found to ensure a stringent application of the disclosure requirement in the 
examination of software patent applications. An extreme and rather indigestible 
though perhaps desirable form of intervention might be to require compulsory 
disclosure of the patented invention source code. Alternatively, a right to reverse 
engineering software may be extended beyond interfaces to the entire patented 
program, as it has been recently suggested by many L&E scholars (see Cohen and 
Lemley, 2001; Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2003 and Burk and Lemley, 2003). Note 
that, of course, providing an effective solution to the problem of patent disclosures 




                                                                                                                
technologies), focusing on the trade-off between length and breadth of protection (for a review 




In this paper, we make a case for technology-specific tailoring of incentives, 
starting from the recognition of the effects exerted by the attributes of different 
technological regimes on the efficiency properties of the intellectual property system. 
The analysis, centered in particular on the patent system, aims at identifying relevant 
factors likely to have a bearing on the effectiveness of its various functions and at 
connecting these factors to the instances of patent system failure most likely to occur 
in the different technological regimes. The effort in this direction is motivated by the 
belief that, although information costs might influence the desirability of technology-
specific tailoring of incentives, informational constraints might be made less binding 
by the identification of some regularities in the requirements for protection of 
different technologies. 
We argue that strong aversion to technology-specific adjustment of incentives may 
only result from a fundamental confusion concerning the means through which the 
latter should be implemented. Indeed, it is the implicit assumption often made that 
adjustment of incentives necessitates the enactment of technology-specific statutes 
that suggests the conclusion that it would impose excessive costs and would not 
ensure the flexibility needed to keep up with the progress of technology. 
Acknowledgment of the fact that technology-specific tailoring of incentives to 
innovate may be achieved through means other than the crafting of specific statutes 
significantly undermines the case against incentive tailoring. In the paper, we 
substantiate this statement with reference to the software and the life science domains, 
providing an overview of the means through which innovation incentives may be 
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